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Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and
Immigration Reform
By BILL ONG HING*
Introduction
ON A COLD, RAW DECEMBER MORNING in Marshalltown, Iowa,
Teresa Blanco woke up to go to work at the local Swift meat packing
plant. Hundreds of others across the town were doing the same thing,
in spite of the miserable mixture of sleet, mist, and slush that awaited
them outside their front doors. As they made their way to the plant,
the workers, who were from Mexico, did not mind the weather.1
Unfortunately, the workers’ day turned into a nightmare soon af-
ter they reported for work. Not long after the plant opened, heavily
armed agents from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agency (“ICE”) stormed onto the scene. Pandemonium broke out.
The workers panicked; many began to run; others tried to hide, some
in dangerous and hazardous areas.2 As the ICE agents began round-
ing up all the workers, they ordered those who were U.S. citizens to go
to the cafeteria. Noncitizens were directed to a different section of the
plant. Agents shouted out instructions: documenteds in one line, un-
documenteds in another. If an agent suspected that the person in the
citizens’ line was undocumented, the agent would instruct the person
to get into the undocumented line. More than one individual was
told, “You have Mexican teeth. You need to go to that line [for un-
documented persons] and get checked.”3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Many thanks to Rhonda Magee,
Jennifer Chaco´n, and David Thronson for their insightful comments on an early draft of
this Article. Thanks also to Victoria Hassid who provided me with important research
assistance and to the USF Law Review Symposium editors for their incredibly helpful
suggestions.
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, COMMISSION HEARING: DES MOINES, IOWA 95–99 (Apr. 29, 2008) (unpublished tran-
script, on file with author) [hereinafter IOWA HEARING].
2. Id. at 39–41.
3. Id. at 66.
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The nightmare was only beginning. Although supervisory ICE
agents carried a civil warrant for a few individuals, the squad de-
manded that all plant employees be held, separated by nationality.
That included U.S. citizen workers who were interrogated and de-
tained. No one was free to leave—not even those who carried evi-
dence of lawful status or proof they were in the process of seeking
proper permission to be in this country. Each was interrogated indi-
vidually. The process took the entire day, and phone calls were not
permitted until later in the day. By the end of the day, ninety were
arrested, but hundreds, including citizens, had been detained for
hours. The entire community was shaken to its core.
Although immigration raids are not a recent phenomenon, this
Article focuses on a few egregious ICE raids that occurred after Presi-
dent Bush’s push for immigration reform in 2004.4 I had the opportu-
nity to learn more about several such raids first hand as part of a
commission that was established by the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union in 2008.5 The Commission spent more
than a year holding regional hearings, interviewing witnesses, and
soliciting input from a wide range of workers, elected officials, policy
experts, psychologists, and religious and community leaders. Commis-
sioners learned about the abuse that ICE officials visited upon work-
ers, their families, and the communities. This Article’s discussion of
ICE raids addresses racial profiling, the trauma to children and fami-
lies, the damage to communities, and some legal considerations.
Descriptions of ICE raids challenge us to think more seriously
about the underlying racial implications of those raids. The tragic ef-
fects on families and communities, as well as the serious constitutional
violations committed by ICE agents during the raids, provide ample
moral and legal justification to end the raids. The inherent racism at
the center of the ICE raids and other ICE and Border Patrol opera-
tions raises further concern that receives little public attention. With
few exceptions, the ICE operations targeted Latinos—usually Mexi-
cans. The exceptions were Chinese restaurants and other businesses
that relied on workers of color. That racial effect is the focus of this
Article and the basis for advocating that both immigration policies
and ICE enforcement need to be rethought.
4. See Bush Pushes Guest-Worker Program, CNN.COM, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.cnn.
com/2006/POLITICS/03/31/bush.cancun/index.html.
5. Professor Hing traveled with the Commission to Washington, D.C., Boston, Des
Moines, Atlanta, and Los Angeles to gather information and learn firsthand how ICE raids
really work.
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The defenders of the Bush-era enforcement regime and the
ongoing border militarization would argue that my claim of inherent
racism is unfair because the vast majority of immigrants—docu-
mented and undocumented—are people of color. They would argue
that if the undocumenteds were white, the raids would still have oc-
curred. But this belies the lack of raids on undocumented Canadians
today, or the undocumented Polish in Chicago in the 1980s and
1990s, or the undocumented Irish population in San Francisco during
the same period. Raids on those white undocumenteds did not hap-
pen. Racism has become institutionalized in our immigration enforce-
ment regime—a regime that focuses mostly on Latinos, especially
Mexicans, and occasionally on Asians.
This Article argues that the structure of immigration laws has in-
stitutionalized a set of values that dehumanize, demonize, and
criminalize immigrants of color. The result is that these victims stop
being Mexicans, Latinos, or Chinese and become “illegal immigrants.”
We are aware of their race or ethnicity, but we believe we are acting
against them because of their status, not because of their race.6 This
institutionalized racism made the Bush ICE raids natural and accept-
able in the minds of the general public. Institutionalized racism allows
the public to think ICE raids are freeing up jobs for native workers
without recognizing the racial ramifications.7 Objections to ICE raids
and the Border Patrol’s Operation Gatekeeper are debated in non-
racial terms. However, not viewing these operations from an institu-
tionalized racial perspective inhibits the total revamping of our immi-
gration system that needs to take place.
Part I begins with a description of selected ICE raids. Part II fol-
lows with a discussion of the institutional racism that is grounded in
the history of U.S. immigration laws and policies. Part III explains how
6. Some in the anti-immigrant movement may have racist motivations, and the con-
nection between some anti-immigrant organizations and the white supremacy movement is
well established. See Jill Garvey, The John Tanton Network and the Anti-Immigrant Movement in
America, IMAGINE 2050, July 7, 2009, http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2009/07/07/the-
john-tanton-network-and-the-anti-immigrant-movement-in-america/#more-2448.
7. One of the largest ICE raids took place at a plant in Laurel, Mississippi on August
25, 2008. Almost 600 workers were arrested. The plant was the site of a labor-organizing
dispute. Black and white employees jeered the Latinos as they were led out. “ ‘Bye-bye,’
some trilled in falsetto, fingers wagging. ‘Go back where you came from.’” See Associated
Press, Have-Nots Hail ICE Raids, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2009/jan/26/have-nots-hail-ice-raids. These workers may have misunderstood
how those deported might have been key to creating worker solidarity. The local union
president, Clarence Larkin, lamented that the new Latino “members were now gone, and
with them . . . went a budding sense of solidarity.” Id.; see also Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of
Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y 121 (2001).
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the racial history of immigration policy has become institutionalized
so that seemingly neutral policies actually have racial effects. Under-
standing the historical underpinnings of race-driven immigration pol-
icy offers a broader range of solutions to current policy and
enforcement challenges. Recognizing the racist nature of the system
allows for a framework to remedy a racist system.
I. Entering the ICE Age of Enforcement
The most recent ICE age began when Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) was established in 2003. The new DHS took over the
old Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) from the Depart-
ment of Justice. Repackaged, interior enforcement functions were
channeled into the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency.
Border enforcement remains in the hands of the Border Patrol.
Immigration raids, including worksite operations, have been part
of immigration enforcement for decades. However, the courts had
placed constraints on INS and Border Patrol agent activities during
raids. For example, in INS v. Delgado,8 although the U.S. Supreme
Court did not find the particular worksite operation in question un-
constitutional, the Court held that INS agents cannot seize an entire
worksite, must allow workers to remain silent, and leave if agents have
no reasonable suspicion that the workers are unauthorized to be in
the United States. In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,9 a federal court
of appeals upheld a trial court opinion in Chicago that INS agents
could not stop and question individuals simply because of Latin ap-
pearance. And, in International Molders’ and Allied Workers’ Local Union
No. 164 v. Nelson,10 a federal court of appeals required INS warrants to
be very specific in naming suspected undocumented workers.
But in January 2004, after Republicans showed little interest for
his guest worker proposal, Bush implemented the current ICE raid
strategy to garner support for his plan. His detractors on the right
argued the proposal was too lenient and amounted to amnesty. Bush
responded with a strong enforcement program. In the process, ICE
agents ignored the legal constraints that had been imposed on the old
8. 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (implying that if a seizure had occurred, it would have
needed articulable suspicion).
9. 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
10. 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986).
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INS raids.11 The actions suggested that the well-established rules were
no longer applicable to the new DHS. Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff and ICE Assistant Secretary Julie Myers ushered in
the new ICE age seemingly free of the old constraints.
A. The Swift Raids
Early on the morning of December 12, 2006, the feast day of Our
Lady of Guadalupe and a holy day of special significance to Catholics
of Mexican descent, ICE conducted a massive military style raid on six
Swift & Company meatpacking plants across the nation’s heartland.
Hundreds of federal agents in riot gear, armed with assault weapons,
descended upon plants in Cactus, Texas; Greeley, Colorado; Grand
Island, Nebraska; Worthington, Minnesota; Marshalltown, Iowa; and
Hyrum, Utah.
ICE was there to execute arrest warrants for a handful of named
workers—less than one percent of the workforce. The sheer number
of ICE agents on the scene and the manner in which the operation
was conducted made clear that the execution of those warrants was
not the government’s real purpose. Rather, the raids seemed designed
to ramp up the number of arrests and capture the headlines on the
evening news.12 ICE rounded up nearly 13,000 workers—the vast ma-
jority of them U.S. citizens—holding them against their will for hours.
According to witness testimony, there were, perhaps, 100 people
standing at the fence in front of the Marshalltown plant by the end of
the day. Many were people who had family members working the first
shift.13
[They] were upset and many were crying since they had no solid
information, only that immigration agents were in the plant, the
lines had been shut down, and that it was serious. . . . [T]here was a
certain panic outside, too, because of the uncertainty and lack of
communication, as well as the fact that many of these people had
11. See, e.g., IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 39–99 (chronicling ICE procedures appar- R
ently out of line with the constitutional constraints, including apparent seizure of entire
factories, suspicion based on Mexican appearance, etc.).
12. ICE alerted the local media in the Greeley, Colorado area the night before the
raids, telling them that they should be at the plant in the morning. Id. at 121.
13. Id. at 24.
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never experienced anything like this before.14 No one was allowed
to go in and no information was coming out.15
Sister Christine said she approached the ICE agents at the gate to
ask for information for the families:
They simply handed me a sheet of paper with a phone number to
call, an 800 number, to call for information on family members,
although the number, obviously, would not be up and running for
some time. The information was in English and there were maybe
25 or 30 copies . . . .16
While Sister Christine and family members held vigil outside, the
workers inside were caught in a frightening, military-style assault. In-
stead of searching out the 133 individuals named on the arrest war-
rants, heavily armed ICE agents fanned out through each of the
affected plants, sealed the exits, and ordered workers into lines where
they were patted down and searched for weapons. After the weapons
search, ICE agents herded workers en masse into the plant cafeterias
or other holding areas and divided them by race and national origin.
Many were denied food, water, or the use of bathroom facilities; some
were handcuffed. No one was advised of their rights nor provided ac-
cess to legal representation at the raid site.17 The overwhelming ma-
jority of those held that day were U.S. citizens. In Marshalltown,
Michael Graves got to work that morning and was instructed to go to
the cafeteria.
[M]e and two other coworkers . . . [were] going our normal route
to the cafeteria. . . . ICE agents that [were] heavily armed met us at
the door and [one agent] asked us where we [were] going. We told
him we were going to the cafeteria as we were instructed to go. He
asked us, did we have any weapons on us and did I have any identi-
fication? I told him I had [my identification] in my locker. He told
us to get against the wall and handcuffed us from behind.
So then he escorted us to the locker room. . . . He asked me,
where’s my identification? I told him it was in my pants pocket. So
14. Dr. Tom Renze, Principal of Woodbury Elementary School in Marshalltown, also
described a “sense of panic” among family members the morning of the raid. While stu-
dents normally begin arriving around 7:30 or 7:45 a.m., he said, by 7:50 a.m., parents were
coming back to the school to pull their children out. Parents or other adults continued to
come for their children throughout the day. Id. at 51–53.
15. Id. at 25. Darrell Harrington’s wife, Amelda Harrington, called the plant when she
learned of the raid from a neighbor and was not only refused any information about what
was occurring but was threatened with arrest if she persisted in her inquiries. Turning on
the television, she said she saw an ICE agent “on the roof . . . dressed in black; he did have
a gun.” The first thing that came to her mind, she told the Commission was, “[am] I going
to see my husband that night? When would I see him? Where was he? . . . I [didn’t] know
what was going to happen.” Id. at 138–39.
16. Id. at 25.
17. Id. at 110–12.
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he went in my pants pocket, pulled out my identification, and ques-
tioned me about [it].
[H]e questioned me about my status as a U.S. citizen and I
said my mother and father were born and raised in Mississippi. He
questioned me about that and asked me, did I know my route to
Mississippi? And I said no, but I can find my way there because I
had been there a lot of times with my parents. He looked at my I.D.
again, told me to sit down with my hands behind my back, still
handcuffed.18
Graves was forced to sit in that position for over an hour. ICE
continued to hold him and coworkers—still deprived of food, water,
and external communication—until he was finally released after eight
hours of captivity and told to “go home.”19
U.S. citizen Melissa Broekemeier worked at the Swift plant in
Marshalltown for more than eight years. But the “longest day [she]
ever worked was on December 12, 2007.”20 Broekemeier described
her experience on the day of the Swift raid this way:
I, like all my coworkers that went to work that day . . . we were
instructed by our supervisors to finish up . . . and report to the
cafeteria, where we were inspected, and our private lives were scru-
tinized by ICE agents as if we were illegal convicts.
. . . .
The power that runs our machines should have been shut off
first, but it was not.
. . . .
The Federal government jeopardized our safety and health
without care. We were overlooked. We were ignored. We were
treated like criminals. We were not free to leave.21
Debra Campbell, a coworker of Broekemeier’s and a nineteen-
year-old Swift employee, was equally distressed by the raid. “My
group,” explained Campbell, “was then walked around the plant to an
out-building where we spent the rest of the working day. We were not
free to leave.”22 Armed ICE agents “drove around in their cars making
sure we weren’t going to run over that fence,” Broekemeier added.
“We had people who really lost control, we had people rolling on the
floor . . . upset and distressed. They really lost their dignity . . . .”23
Outside the plant, throughout the day, fear continued to grow
because of rumors that were spreading among the people waiting.
18. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, RAIDS ON WORKERS: DESTROYING
OUR RIGHTS 5–6 (2008).
19. IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 110–12. R
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id. at 46.
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There was no communication with the people inside the plant.
“Around mid-afternoon some workers came out in handcuffs, were
put on buses, and the buses drove away. Because the windows were
dark, no one was sure who was on the buses and who might be
released.”24
During their interviews with ICE agents at the plant, the alleged
undocumented workers were asked if they had children, but were not
told that one of the parents would be allowed to remain to care for
them. Many parents were afraid to say “yes” because they feared their
children would be taken away from them and placed in foster care. In
one case, a six-year-old and two-and-a-half-year-old stayed with a baby-
sitter for three weeks until the mother was deported. In another fam-
ily, an elderly woman had been living with her daughter. The
daughter was detained, and the mother spoke no English, did not
drive, and was not familiar with Marshalltown.
The fact that the Marshalltown arrestees were held at Camp
Dodge, a military base almost sixty miles away, added a surreal effect.
Camp Dodge is in Johnston, Iowa, run by the Iowa National Guard.
The detainees were held inside the military compound without access
to lawyers or clergy. Some detainees were released in the middle of
the night, without the ability to make phone calls, without knowing
anyone in the area, on a country road, miles from the nearest phone,
miles from any help, miles from any transportation on a cold Decem-
ber night. Some detainees were brought to Camp Dodge from the
more distant raids in Colorado and Nebraska. Many families did not
know where their arrested loved ones had been taken; a week later
approximately half the people were still not accounted for. They were
desaparecidos (disappeared). As the Reverend Barbara Dinnen said, if
“you’ve come from El Salvador, Argentina, or Guatemala or any of
those countries that have been through civil wars, desipado sido for
one week doesn’t mean anything good.”25
Immigrant rights attorney, Sonia Konrad, concluded that the ICE
agents “conducted themselves as if they were dealing with terrorists
entering the premises in uniform, black jackets, strapped down guns,
shouting and leaving no doubt to all workers that . . . they were not
free to go.”26
ICE made sure that people were uprooted and moved out of Iowa
quickly, some of them within twenty-four hours of their arrests and
24. Id. at 25–26.
25. Id. at 84.
26. Id.
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detention. Once arrested, people were coerced into signing stipulated
orders of deportations without an opportunity to consult with an at-
torney. Konrad and her colleagues were relegated to quickly writing
powers of attorneys and guardianships for those detainees. The hope
was that at least the detainees could legally delegate care of their chil-
dren and property. But the attorneys could not get through to many.
Attorneys tried to straighten things out later, but ICE agents coldly
argued that detainees had already had their chance. Any trust that the
community or advocates may have had in local ICE officials was shat-
tered in an instant.27
B. Other Raids
1. Stillmore, Georgia
One ICE raid in Stillmore, Georgia, the Friday before Labor Day
weekend in 2006, evoked outcry from local residents who labeled the
ICE action as nothing short of “Gestapo tactics.”28 Descending shortly
before midnight, ICE agents swarmed the area, eventually arresting
and deporting 125 undocumented workers.29 Most of those rounded
up were men, while their wives fled to the woods to hide children in
tow.30 In the weeks after the raid, at least 200 more immigrants left
town. Many of the women purchased bus tickets to Mexico with their
husband’s final paycheck.31 The impact underscored how vital un-
documented immigrants were to the local economy. Trailer parks lie
abandoned. The poultry plant scrambled to replace more than half its
workforce. Business dried up at stores. The community of about a
thousand people became little more than a ghost town. The operator
of a trailer park that was raided, David Robinson, commented, “These
people might not have American rights, but they’ve damn sure got
human rights. There ain’t no reason to treat them like animals.”32
Local residents witnessed the events, as ICE officials raided local
homes and trailer parks, forcing many members of the community out
27. Id. at 109–16.
28. NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, COMMISSION HEARING: ATLANTA, GEORGIA 31, June 16, 2008 (unpublished tran-
script, on file with author) (detailing excessive brutality of ICE enforcement practices dur-
ing the raids) [hereinafter GEORGIA HEARING].
29. Dahleen Glanton, For Immigrants, Raid Dims Hope for a Better Life, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
11, 2006.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Russ Bynum, Immigration Raids Leave Georgia Town Bereft, Stunned, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2006.
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of Stillmore. Officials were seen stopping motorists, breaking into
homes, and there were even reports of officials threatening people
with tear gas.33 Witnesses reported seeing ICE officials breaking win-
dows and entering homes through floorboards.34 Mayor Marilyn
Slater commented, “This reminds me of what I read about Nazi Ger-
many, the Gestapo coming in and yanking people up.”35
2. San Rafael, California
On March 6, 2007, ICE officials raided the small communities of
San Rafael and Novato in Marin County, arresting roughly thirty un-
documented immigrants. This raid was also part of ICE’s “Operation
Return to Sender,” the federal effort to crack down on immigrants
who have stayed past their deportation orders. ICE officials armed
with warrants bearing dated and/or incorrect information stormed
homes and began arresting violators regardless of whether they were
named in the original warrant. The San Rafael raid became a national
symbol of the negative effects raids have on children. Juan Rodriguez,
principal of Bahia Vista Elementary School, noted that on a typical
day the school might have eight to ten children absent, but seventy-
seven children were absent the day of the raid.36 San Rafael’s Mayor
Alberto Boro criticized federal officials, noting that the raid resulted
in a drop in calls to local law enforcement agencies and signaled a
heightened level of mistrust of police within the community.37
3. New Bedford, Massachusetts
In March 2007, nearly 500 ICE officials descended upon the small
southern New England community of New Bedford, Massachusetts.
ICE officials targeted the local Michael Bianco, Inc. plant, a leather
goods manufacturer that had manufactured goods for brands such as
Coach, Rockport, and Timberland.38 As with other larger raids, the
event split families and underscored the negative effects the raids have
33. Press Release, Southern Poverty Law Center, SPLC Sues Immigration Agency
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?site_area=1&aid=221.
34. Patrick Jonsson, Crackdown on Immigrants Empties a Town and Hardens Views, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 2006, at 1.
35. Bynum, supra note 32. R
36. Mark Prado, 30 Illegal Immigrants Targeted in Canal Neighborhood Raid, MARIN INDEP.
J., Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.marinij.com/marin/ci_5372749.
37. Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Bay Area Reacts Angrily to Series of Immigration Raids,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at A14.
38. Ken Maguire, Factory Struggles After Immigration Raid, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/28/AR20070328013
92.html.
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on communities. Because many of Bianco’s employees were women,
this created a crisis with caring for their children. Roughly 100 chil-
dren were stranded with babysitters and other caregivers as their
mothers were seized during the raid.39 The majority of those arrested
were moved to detention centers halfway across the country in Texas.
4. Postville, Iowa
One of the largest immigration raids in U.S. history occurred in
April 2008 in the small, Midwest town of Postville, Iowa. The raid oc-
curred at the kosher meat plant, Agriprocessors, Inc., the largest em-
ployer in town and one of the largest in northeastern Iowa. ICE seized
over 400 undocumented workers, including eighteen juveniles.40
Agriprocessors employed approximately 970 workers, eighty per-
cent of whom were believed to have fraudulent identification.41 After
the raid, the entire Postville community was in recovery mode. Mayor
Robert Penrod speculated on the effect of a possible Agriprocessor
closure, estimating that “two-thirds of the homes here will sit empty
[and] 95% of downtown business . . . will dry up.”42 One witness la-
beled the government strategy criminal as hundreds of women and
children were faced with the threat of being left “homeless and
starving.”43
39. Ray Henry, Children Stranded After Immigration Raid, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2007/03/07/children_
stranded_after_immigration_raid_1173298898.
40. Antonio Olivio, Immigration Raid Roils Iowa Melting Pot, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 2008, at
C1. In a heavy-handed procedure, 302 of the workers were fast-tracked with criminal
charges, most related to identity theft. Although the Supreme Court had ruled in another
case that undocumenteds must use another actual person’s identity to be guilty of identity
theft, the Postville detainees’ knowledge regarding the origin of fraudulent employment
documents was not a factor. They were quickly convicted on identity theft-related charges.
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
41. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Raid Jars a Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008, at
A01. The raid was not the first sign of trouble for Agriprocessors, Inc. The company had
been under scrutiny for numerous violations of environmental laws, labor laws, and was on
notice that there was an alleged methamphetamine lab being run from inside the plant. See
also Steven Greenhouse, Shuttered Meat Plant Edges Back into Business, But Its Town Is Still
Struggling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A29 (bankruptcy trustee authorizes re-opening of
plant, Agriprocessors re-hires 200 employees); Rubashkin Son Arrested, Agriprocessors Fined
$10 Million in Kosher Slaughterhouse Probe, JEWISHJOURNAL.COM, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.
jewishjournal.com/food/article/rubashkin_son_arrested_agriprocessors_fined_10_mil-
lion_in_kosher_slaughterh/ (four managers arrested, Agriprocessors fined $9.98 million).
42. Raids Could Make Postville a Ghost Town, KAALTV.COM, May 14, 2008, http://
www.crownheights.info/index.php?itemid=11931.
43. Jonah Newman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A24.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-2\SAN205.txt unknown Seq: 12 29-DEC-09 8:36
318 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
As in other communities, the school system also felt the immedi-
ate impact of the raids. The local school district estimated that 150 of
the 220 students from immigrant families were absent the day after
the raid.44
5. Northern California Chinese Restaurants
On September 17, 2008, ICE special agents executed federal
criminal search warrants at four sites in the northern California towns
of Vacaville, Vallejo, and Hercules, in the North Bay area northeast of
San Francisco, as part of an investigation into the hiring and possible
harboring of unauthorized workers at local Chinese restaurants. ICE
agents made no criminal arrests but arrested twenty-one workers on
administrative immigration violations. The arrested workers were
from five countries: nine from China, five from Mexico, three from
Guatemala, two from Indonesia, one from Singapore, and one from
Honduras.
C. Racial Profiling
The United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) Commis-
sion heard repeated testimony about racial profiling. Witnesses testi-
fied that workers who appeared to be of Latino national origin or
minorities were singled out by ICE and subjected to the greatest scru-
tiny. John Bowen, General Counsel for UFCW Local 7, said “race was,
almost without question, the sole criteria for harsher interrogations”
to which the workers were subjected at the Greeley, Colorado plant.45
Fidencio Sandoval, a U.S. citizen and Swift worker at the Grand Is-
land, Nebraska, plant, recounted how he was treated differently by
ICE agents because he appeared to be Latino:
When they said all the U.S. citizens come over to this place, I went
up there and I stood right by my boss. My boss showed his driver’s
license and then he was free to go. I showed my driver’s license and
my voting registration card and that was not enough. [The ICE
agent] said, no, you need either your passport or citizenship
certificate.46
44. Mary Ann Zehr, Iowa School District Left Coping with Immigration Raid’s Impact, EDUC.
WK., May 21, 2008, at 7.
45. IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 109. R
46. Id.
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Eventually, he was able to produce his documents, after his sister
was able to go to his home, “break the window from my kitchen and
go straight to my closet and get my citizen certificate.”47
Other U.S. citizen coworkers were not as fortunate. Those who
did not have a way to prove their citizenship were arrested and taken
to Camp Dodge, located nearly 300 miles from Grand Island. Manuel
Verdinez was one of those U.S. citizen workers from the Marshalltown
plant who was detained, arrested, handcuffed, and taken into custody.
“I said I was a U.S. citizen, and then the [ICE] agent started scratching
my ID. The agent . . . said they could not find my status. They put
plastic cuffs around my wrists and put all of my belongings into a
plastic bag.”48 After twelve hours in detention, “they found my re-
cord . . . and said they had made a mistake. Then [the ICE agent]
finally took off my handcuffs . . . [t]hey called a cab for me and I had
to pay $90 for the cab ride back.”49
ICE raids and increased enforcement are poisoning communi-
ties, spawning scores of state and local anti-immigrant laws and ordi-
nances that target Latinos. All of this increases discrimination.
According to Sam Zamarripa, president of the Board of Directors of
the Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials and a former State
Senator in Georgia, these policies are led and advanced by white su-
premacist organizations.50
The increased racial profiling and selective enforcement is also
evident in the manner in which local police enforce immigration law
pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.51
47. NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, COMMISSION MEETING: BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 109 (2008) (unpublished tran-
script, on file with author) [hereinafter MASS. HEARING].
48. Id. at 111.
49. Id. at 111–13.
50. See UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, supra note 18, at 30–31; see
also Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, Reports & Publications, http://
www.galeo.org/reports_listing.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (listing reports documenting
contemporary Civil Rights developments).
51. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). Section
287(g) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into agreements with state
and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated officers to perform immigra-
tion law enforcement functions. The University of North Carolina Immigration & Human
Rights Policy Clinic (with Professor Deborah Weissman as Director of Clinical Programs)
and the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation have released
a report on section 287(g) in North Carolina titled The Policies and Politics of Local Immigra-
tion Enforcement Laws. This report represents valuable cooperation between advocates and
academia in a state at the forefront of immigration collaborations between the federal
government and local law enforcement. Here is a portion of the executive summary of the
report’s findings:
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In Nashville, Tennessee, a police officer pulled over Juana Villegas,
who was nine months pregnant at the time, for a routine traffic viola-
tion.52 The arrest was made pursuant to a section 287(g) agreement
and resulted in Villegas’ detention in county jail. According to the
New York Times, Villegas went into labor and delivered her baby with a
“sheriff’s officer standing guard in her hospital room, where one of
her feet was cuffed to the bed most of the time.”53
Zamarripa maintains that the state enforcement of immigration
law in Georgia “has created an arbitrary and capricious application of
the rule of law.”54 The Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights is-
sued a special report, concluding that most arrests conducted under
section 287(g) in Cobb County were for the offense of driving without
a license, hardly the serious crime or threat to national security that
section 287(g) agreements contemplate.55 Zamarripa claims that,
“there is an overriding assumption that all immigrants are essentially
guilty. . . . a public view that it is open season on immigrants. Anything
goes in this wild, [W]ild [W]est anarchy. This is . . . why the miscon-
duct is so pervasive within our law enforcement community, including
ICE.”56
D. Trauma to Children and Families
Family separation and the special damage to children have been
particularly tragic consequences of the ICE raids.57 Most of the chil-
The 287(g) program was originally intended to target and remove undocu-
mented immigrants convicted of “violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organ-
ized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and money
laundering.” However, MOAs [memoranda of agreements] are in actuality being
used to purge towns and cities of ‘unwelcome’ immigrants and thereby having
detrimental effects on North Carolina’s communities.
ACLU AND IMMIGR. & HUM. RTS. POL’Y CLINIC, THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMI-
GRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA 8 (2009).
52. Julia Preston, Immigrant, Pregnant, Is Jailed Under Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at
A13.
53. Id.
54. GEORGIA HEARING, supra note 28. R
55. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, supra note 18, at n.85. R
56. GEORGIA HEARING, supra note 28, at 33. R
57. One particularly tragic example is that of Diego and Maria, two sibling high
school students from Marshalltown. IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 63–78. They testified R
before the Commission about the day their mother was arrested during the raid at the
Swift plant in Iowa. Their mother was detained for two days, and during that time they
were responsible for the care of their younger siblings, ages five and three. Id. at 69–71.
Maria told the Commission, “At night, I had to do the hardest thing in the world; explain
to a three-year-old and a five-year-old what was happening and why their mother wasn’t
coming home.” Id. Diego recalled: “when I woke [on the day of the raid] it was like a
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dren impacted by raids were U.S. citizens and most were very young—
about two-thirds were under ten and about one-third were under age
five.58 In three sites studied by the National Council of La Raza, re-
searchers found that “families and relatives scramble[d] to rearrange
care, children spent at least one night without a parent, often in the
care of a relative or non-relative babysitter, in some cases neighbors
and in some cases even landlords; some children were cared for by
extended families for weeks and months.”59 Families directly affected
by the raid also suffered economic hardship and financial instability
that “creates conditions that are detrimental to children’s develop-
ment.”60 The National Council of La Raza study also analyzed the
emotional and mental side effects upon children. While the long-term
effects of the raids are still unraveling, psychologists have already ob-
served and are concerned about long-term depression and other
mental illness in family members. The report found that younger chil-
dren translated the temporary parental absence as abandonment.
One parent reported that her child feared that her father “love[s]
money more than he loves me.”61
According to Dr. Amaro Laria, Director of the Lucero Latino
Mental Health Training Program at the Massachusetts School of Pro-
fessional Psychology and faculty of the psychiatry department at
Harvard Medical School, “[o]ne of the most well established facts in
mental health is that abrupt separation of children from their parents,
particularly their mothers, are among the most severely traumatic ex-
periences that a child can undergo.”62 He testified that in the case of
the raid, the “traumatic separations [were] perpetrated and sanc-
tioned by our nation’s law enforcement agencies, ironically in the
nightmare. My sister came in crying and told me that there was a raid at the Swift plant.”
Id. at 64. Diego testified that when he got to school that day “there was crying and despair”
and the parking lot was half empty. Id. at 64–67. Diego went home after lunch when he
learned that his uncle had been detained. “At that time I had no idea what happened to
my mother.” Id. at 64–65. In Maria’s testimony, she recalled that when she learned of the
raid at Swift, the plant where her mother worked, “I froze and I felt like I couldn’t
breathe. . . . I felt so much hate and sorrow in my heart, a feeling that I had never felt
before.” Id. at 70.
58. GEORGIA HEARING, supra note 28, at 89. According to Ms. Rosa Maria Castaneda, R
“nationally there are about 5 million children with undocumented parents in the U.S., two-
thirds are U.S. citizens and a similar share are age 10 or under.” Id.; see also NAT’L COUNCIL
OF LA RAZA, PAYING THE PRICE: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN
(2007).
59. GEORGIA HEARING, supra note 28, at 91–92.
60. Id. at 93–94.
61. NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 58, at 50–51. R
62. MASS. HEARING, supra note 47, at 96. R
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name of protecting citizens.”63 In his opinion, ICE had engaged in
terrorism against these families and children.
Dr. Laria told the Commission about a young girl, Deanna, who
said, “she wanted to kill herself because her mother had abandoned
her.”64 Dr. Laria also testified about a girl who called 911 looking for
her mother and a young “desperate father, who, after his wife was
imprisoned, had to rush their infant daughter to the emergency room
with severe dehydration because she hadn’t been breastfed for
days.”65
E. Damage to Communities
ICE raids and increased enforcement have caused severe social
and civic damage and major setbacks for many communities. In Iowa,
communities had developed several successful initiatives designed to
stimulate the assimilation of immigrants into the fabric of the commu-
nities where they resided. Great progress toward integration and un-
derstanding had taken place in Marshalltown.66 But the ICE raid
undid much of that progress. The raid had given some members of
the community “a justification for discriminating against all immi-
grants, documented or not.”67
Raids also hurt local economies. Jorge Avellanada, city council
member and a business leader in Chelsea, Massachusetts, told the
Commission that the raids resulted in a thirty percent decline in sales
due in part to the fear that workers had about going to work, shop-
ping, or going about their normal business.68
63. Id.
64. Id. at 98.
65. Id.
66. IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 20. Marshalltown was cited as a model community R
during former Governor Tom Vilsack’s administration. Id. Sponsored by former Governor
Vilsack, the “New Iowan Centers” proved to be extremely helpful in promoting integration
of new immigrants and Iowans into the state. Id. at 107–08.
67. Id. at 30.
68. MASS. HEARING, supra note 47, at 56. Steven Pitts, Ph.D., presented a statement at a R
town hall meeting on immigration before Congresswoman Barbara Lee on the impact of
ICE raids on the economy. In his written statement, Mr. Pitts referenced a study conducted
by the Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation that identified the impact that
raids would have on the Los Angeles economy. Based on the impact of (1) direct job loss;
(2) secondary job loss to business where the undocumented spent money; and (3) loss of
tax revenue, the study projected that an ICE raid would cost L.A. County “between 74,000
and 500,000 jobs and between $8.7 million and $57.2 million in tax revenue.” See STEVEN
PITTS, PH.D., THE IMPACT OF THE ICE RAIDS ON THE ECONOMY (on file with the
Commission).
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The negative ramifications of the raids on communities manifest
themselves in other ways. Increased enforcement and high profile mil-
itary-style raids have resulted in the immigrant community being
afraid to report abuse or crime for fear of being turned over to ICE.69
II. Institutional Racism and U.S. Immigration Policy
This Article contends that the evolution of immigration laws and
the manner in which immigration laws operate have institutionalized
bias against Latino immigrants—Mexicans in particular—and Asian
immigrants. This has occurred through laws that initially manifested
racist intent and/or impact, amendments that perpetuated that ra-
cism, and enforcement strategies and legal interpretations reinforcing
the racism. Racism has been institutionalized in our immigration laws
and enforcement policies.
Kwame Ture (a.k.a. Stokely Carmichael) coined the phrase “insti-
tutional racism” in the 1960s. He recognized it was important to dis-
tinguish personal bias from institutional bias, which is generally long-
term and grounded more in inertia than in intent. Institutional ra-
cism has come to describe societal patterns that impose oppressive or
otherwise negative conditions against identifiable groups on the basis
of race or ethnicity.
In the United States, institutional racism resulted from the social
caste system of slavery and racial segregation. Much of its basic struc-
ture still stands to this day. By understanding the fundamental princi-
ples of institutionalized racism we begin to see the application of the
concept beyond the conventional black-white paradigm. Institutional
racism embodies discriminating against certain groups of people
through the use of biased laws or practices. Structures and social ar-
rangements become accepted, operate, and are manipulated in such a
way as to support or acquiesce in acts of racism. Institutional racism
can be subtle and less visible, but is no less destructive than individual
acts of racism.
Charles Lawrence’s discussion of unconscious racism also is rele-
vant. Lawrence teaches us that the source of much racism lies in the
unconscious mind. Individuals raised in a racist culture unknowingly
absorb attitudes and stereotypes that influence behavior in subtle, but
69. MASS. HEARING, supra note 47, at 58. R
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pernicious ways. “Unconscious prejudice . . . is not subject to self-cor-
rection within the political process.”70
The forces of racism have become embodied in U.S. immigration
laws.71 As these laws are enforced, they are accepted as common prac-
tice, in spite of their racial effects. We may not like particular laws or
enforcement policies because of their harshness or their violations of
human dignity or civil rights, but many of us do not sense the inher-
ent racism because we are not cognizant of the dominant racial frame-
work. Understanding the evolution of U.S. immigration laws and
enforcement provides us with a better awareness of the institutional
racism that controls those policies. This Part focuses on the evolution
of immigration laws and enforcement policies. The history begins with
slavery. Forced African labor migration set the stage for the Mexicans
and the Chinese. This Part reviews the history of Mexican migration,
the enforcement of the southwest border, and the sea change to en-
forcement through employer sanctions enacted in 1986.
A. Enslavement of African Workers As Forced Immigration Policy
In her contribution to this Symposium, Professor Rhonda Magee
writes convincingly that the notion of immigrant must include the
forced immigration system of chattel slavery and that the law and pol-
icy of chattel slavery is a relevant historical antecedent to today’s immi-
gration law.72 She points out:
[S]lavery was, in significant part (though hardly exclusively), an im-
migration system of a particularly reprehensible sort: a system of
state-sponsored forced migration human trafficking, endorsed by
Congress, important to the public fisc as a source of tax revenue,
and aimed at fulfilling the need for a controllable labor population
in the colonies, and then in the states, at an artificially low eco-
nomic cost.73
Professor Magee concludes:
Viewing immigration as a function of slavery helps us articulate an
important irony: that with respect to immigration, slavery—our ra-
cially based forced migration system—laid a foundation for both a
70. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 349 (1987).
71. Kevin Johnson has recognized that “U.S. immigration laws . . . are nothing less
than a ‘magic mirror’ into the nation’s collective consciousness about its perceived na-
tional identity—and the exclusion of poor and working people of color from that identity
as well as from full membership in American social life.” Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection
of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth-
coming 2009).
72. Rhonda V. Magee, Slavery as Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 277 (2009).
73. Id. at 289–99.
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racially segmented labor-based immigration system, and a racially
diverse (even if racially hierarchical) “nation of immigrants.” These
legacies which the founders may not have set out to leave, but
which are among the United States’ most pernicious and most pre-
cious gifts to civilization.74
Scholars generally trace the beginning of racially restrictive U.S.
immigration policies to laws directed at various immigrant groups.
Prior to 1870, the subordination of people of African descent was fur-
ther underscored by the fact that people from Africa could not be-
come U.S. citizens through naturalization. The Nationality Act of 1790
limited naturalization to “free white persons” and specifically ex-
cluded African Americans and Native Americans.75 However, in 1870,
Congress extended naturalization rights to anyone of African
descent.76
Throughout the immigration history of the United States, Afri-
cans have been underrepresented as a voluntary immigrant group.
Before 1965, Africans represented less than one percent of the total
immigrant population.77 In 1990, Africans still constituted only 2.3%
of all immigrants.78 By 2008, African immigrants made up 9.6% of all
immigrants.79
The effect of forced immigration in the African American popu-
lation today is readily apparent. The U.S. Census Bureau reported
that in 2007, African Americans make up 13.5% of the total U.S. pop-
ulation.80 The descendants of slavery make up the vast majority of to-
day’s African American population.
B. Mexican Immigration
Rightly or wrongly, today the so-called “illegal immigration” prob-
lem has become synonymous with the control, or lack thereof, of the
74. Id.
75. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103–04 (1790). Years later, when Japanese
immigrants unsuccessfully sought naturalization as “free white persons,” the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the 1790 naturalization statute intended that “Negroes and Indians”
were to be denied naturalization. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196 (1922).
76. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (1870).
77. U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE STAT. Y.B. OF THE IMMIGR. AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERV., 1989, at xvii (1990).
78. U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE STAT. Y.B. OF THE IMMIGR. AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERV., 1990, at 53 tbl.3 (1991).
79. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 1990, at 4 tbl.3 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2008.pdf. The number of new lawful permanent re-
sidents from Africa that year was 105,915. Id.
80. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 POPULATION ESTIMATES, at tbl.T3–2007 (2007).
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southwest border. As such, the “problem” is synonymous with Mexican
migration, and Mexican immigrants have come to be regarded by
many anti-immigrant voices as the enemy. The anti-immigrant activists
do not regard themselves as racist; they view themselves as the voice
for law and order. The history of the border, labor recruitment, and
border enforcement explains how the institutionalization of anti-Mex-
ican immigration policies have created the structure to allow these
voices to claim racial and ethnic neutrality and for many Americans to
accept that claim.
1. Migration Between 1848 and the 1960s
Gerald Lo´pez provides a clear picture of the historical relation-
ship between Mexican migration and the United States.81 Long before
the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and terms
like globalization or transnationalism were in vogue, Mexicans and
Americans were living the reality of interconnected economies and
societies. The southwest border essentially became an open border in
1848, when the United States forced Mexico to sign the Treaty of
Guadalupe. The United States gained California and New Mexico (in-
cluding present-day Nevada, Utah, and Arizona) and recognition of
the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas.82 This amounted
to fifty-five percent of Mexico’s former territory. The treaty gave all
Mexicans living in the ceded territory the option of becoming U.S.
citizens or relocating within Mexican borders. In the years immedi-
ately following the treaty, many Mexicans thought of the territories as
part of Mexico.83 “Mexicans and Americans paid little heed to the
newly created international border, which was unmarked and wholly
unreal to most.”84
Lo´pez argues that promotion of Mexican immigration was part of
a larger pattern of labor recruitment that began to emerge in the
United States in the late nineteenth century.85 From 1910 to 1920,
approximately 200,000 Mexicans were admitted into the United
States, many actively recruited to fill severe manpower shortages re-
sulting from war and the curtailment of cheap European labor migra-
81. Gerald P. Lo´pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 641–72
(1981).
82. See id. at 642.
83. Id. at 642–43.
84. J. Martinez, Mexican Emigration to the U.S. 1910–1930, at 1 (1971) (unpublished
dissertation, on file with UCLA Research Library).
85. Lo´pez, supra note 81, at 644. R
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tion.86 In the decade after World War I, U.S. recognition of Mexican
labor’s value grew out of economic necessity. Nearly 500,000 Mexican
workers crossed the border during the 1920s.87
In 1942, the United States negotiated a treaty with Mexico known
as the Bracero Program, providing for the use of Mexicans as tempo-
rary workers in U.S. agriculture.88 With the exception of slavery, in
terms of servicing U.S. economic interests, the program was a histori-
cal first.89 The Bracero Program was renewed consecutively through-
out the administrations of five U.S. presidents. Braceros constituted a
quarter of the farm labor force in California, Arizona, New Mexico,
and Texas, contributing to U.S. dominance in agriculture.90
In spite of the program, undocumented Mexican migration was
significant during this era. United States policy makers “must have
been aware that recruitment activities designed to promote the
Bracero Program would encourage poor Mexicans to believe the
United States was a land of opportunity, thereby encouraging those
who could not be admitted legally to enter” without inspection.91 Lo´-
pez continues: “The relative attractiveness of illegal entry was in-
creased by the failure to enforce the promises that had been made in
connection with the adoption of the Bracero Program.”92 But when
the number of undocumented workers became politically intolerable,
the response was all too familiar. In 1954, over one million undocu-
mented Mexicans were deported as part of an INS initiative dubbed
Operation Wetback.93
Over time, reports of depressed wages and poor working condi-
tions endured by the braceros plus complaints by organized labor
about unfair wage competition led to the cancellation of the pro-
gram.94 The “emergency wartime measure” survived twenty-two years
through 1964 and employed nearly five million Mexican workers. Em-
ployers almost exclusively used the undocumented program after
their defeat on the issue of the Bracero Program and a related H-2
workers provision. The period between 1964 and 1986 evidenced an
86. Id. at 655–56.
87. Id. at 660–61.
88. Id. at 664.
89. Id. at 666.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 668.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 670.
94. See Marjorie S. Zatz, Using and Abusing Mexican Farm-Workers: The Bracero Program
and the INS, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 851–63 (1993).
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effective campaign to insure the continued existence of the undocu-
mented program focused primarily on preserving immunity for those
employing undocumented workers.
Direct and indirect recruitment has continued in spite of the im-
plementation of employer sanctions legislation in 1986. Even today,
farm labor contractors travel to Mexican cities and towns to convince
potential farm workers to cross the border into the United States. The
process involves well-organized networks of contractors and contrac-
tor agents representing major U.S. agricultural companies. Many U.S.
companies are willing to foot the costs of illegally bringing the work-
ers into the country.
As organized labor and public sentiment toward undocumented
Mexican workers became increasingly negative in the 1970s, resources
for border enforcement were enhanced, and the Border Patrol’s pri-
mary task became patrolling the southern border. By the mid 1990s,
eighty-eight percent of the Border Patrol’s agents were stationed
along the Mexican border, and southern border apprehensions ac-
counted for ninety-eight percent of all border apprehensions.95
2. Restraints on Mexican Immigration in the 1970s
For the first time, a quota on the number of visas was imposed on
Western Hemisphere countries in 1965. Thus, while the rest of the
world enjoyed an expansion of numerical limitations and a definite
preference system after 1965, Mexico and the Western Hemisphere
were suddenly faced with numerical restrictions. The Western Hemi-
sphere was allotted a total of 120,000 immigrant visas each year, and
while the first-come, first-serve basis for immigration sounded fair, ap-
plicants had to meet strict labor certification requirements and
demonstrate they would not be displacing U.S. workers. Waivers of the
labor certification requirement were available, however, for certain
applicants, such as parents of U.S. citizen children. As one might ex-
pect, by 1976 the procedure had resulted in a severe backlog of ap-
proximately three years and a waiting list with nearly 300,000 names.96
As the immigration of Mexicans became the focus of more de-
bate, Congress enacted legislation in 1976, further curtailing Mexican
migration. The law imposed the preference system on Mexico and the
Western Hemisphere along with a 20,000 visa per country numerical
limitation. Thus, Mexico’s annual visa usage rate, which had been
95. U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 77, at tbl.349.
96. See CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 1.4c (1993).
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about 40,000, was virtually cut in half overnight, and thousands were
left stranded on the old system’s waiting list.97 In 1978, the 120,000
Western Hemisphere and 170,000 Eastern Hemisphere quotas were
merged into a single 290,000 worldwide numerical limit on
immigration.98
3. Supreme Court Blessings to Target Mexicans
As the INS enforcement budget grew larger and larger during the
1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court, swayed by arguments that the
undocumented alien problem was worsening, gave more flexibility to
INS enforcement strategies. These cases, which involve Mexican na-
tionals, demonstrate the Court’s role in institutionalizing racism. As
the case law evolved, the policy became couched in terms of proce-
dure and about non-racial “illegal aliens,” rather than about the fact
that these were Mexicans coming to the United States seeking a better
life.
In 1973, the Supreme Court appeared to have put an end to the
Border Patrol practice of “roving” near the United States-Mexico bor-
der to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable cause. In Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States,99 INS officials unsuccessfully argued that
as long as they were in the proximity of the border, their efforts in
following and stopping cars located near the border was the “func-
tional equivalent” of the border.100
But, within two years, the Supreme Court—overwhelmed by gov-
ernment claims of a crisis at the border—opened the door to stops by
roving patrols near the border under certain circumstances. In United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,101 two Border Patrol officers were observing
northbound traffic from a patrol car parked at the side of Interstate 5
north of San Diego.102 They pursued Brignoni-Ponce’s car and
97. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976); Silva v. Bell, 605
F.2d 978, 980–82 (1978). Backlogs have resulted from too few immigrant visas available to
Mexicans each year, which in turn contributes to family members who enter without in-
spection to reunite with relatives already in the United States. See David B. Thronson, You
Can’t Get Here From Here: Toward a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 58, 75 (2006). Of course, most aliens who have entered without inspection are from
Mexico, and they are purportedly punished for their surreptitious entry, not because they
are Mexican.
98. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90
Stat. 2703 (1976) (creating basis for future visa allocations).
99. 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
100. Id.
101. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
102. Id.
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stopped it because the three occupants appeared to be of Mexican
descent. The Supreme Court agreed that a roving patrol of the Border
Patrol should not be allowed to stop a vehicle near the Mexican bor-
der and question its occupants, when the only ground for suspicion is
that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry. But the Court
went on to say that patrolling officers may stop vehicles if they are
aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences,
reasonably warranting suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country and the occupants can be questioned.
Something as small as aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion.
The Court also acknowledged that trained officers can recognize the
characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on
such factors as the mode of dress and haircut.
The Court’s deference to Border Patrol was influenced by claims
that undocumented Mexican migration was getting out of hand. The
Court explained its reasoning, relying on figures provided by the
government:
INS now suggests there may be as many as 10 or 12 million
aliens illegally in the country. . . . [T]hese aliens create significant
economic and social problems.
. . . .
The Border Patrol’s traffic-checking operations . . . succeed in
apprehending some illegal entrants and smugglers, and they deter
the movement of others by threatening apprehension and increas-
ing the cost of illegal transportation.103
Within a year, in 1976, the Court carved out a major exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against search and seizure to fur-
ther accommodate the Border Patrol. The case, United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte,104 involved the legality of a fixed checkpoint located on
Interstate 5 near San Clemente, California. The checkpoint is sixty-six
road miles north of the Mexican border. The “point” agent, standing
between the two lanes of traffic, visually screens all northbound vehi-
cles, which the checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt.
In a small number of cases, the “point” agent will direct cars to a sec-
ondary inspection area for further inquiry. In the three situations that
were challenged in Martinez-Fuerte, the Government conceded that
none of the three stops was based on articulable suspicion.
The defendants argued that the routine stopping of vehicles at a
checkpoint was invalid because Brignoni-Ponce must be read as prohib-
iting any stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion. However, the
103. Id.
104. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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Court recognized that maintenance of a traffic-checking program in
the interior is necessary because “the flow of illegal aliens cannot be
controlled effectively at the border,” holding:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based
on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of
traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a
given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens.105
Fixed checkpoints, even miles and miles away from the border,
now were constitutional, even in the absence of articulable facts.
Again, the Court cited the importance of supporting the Border Pa-
trol’s efforts in enforcing immigration laws.
The Supreme Court majority was not concerned with racial over-
tones even though the Border Patrol was basing secondary inspections
on those who looked Mexican. A dissenting opinion by Justice William
Brennan warned: “Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and
every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today’s
decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk.”106
Less than a decade later, in 1984, the Supreme Court made it
quite clear that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against illegal
search and seizure was not available to aliens fighting deportation
even if INS officials acted illegally. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,107 INS
agents arrested Lopez-Mendoza at his place of employment, a trans-
mission repair shop. The agents had no warrant to search the prem-
ises or to arrest any of its occupants. The proprietor of the shop
refused to allow the agents to interview his employees during working
hours. Nevertheless, while one agent engaged the proprietor in con-
versation, another entered the shop and approached Lopez-Mendoza.
After questioning and arrest, Lopez-Mendoza admitted he was not a
legal resident. While the arrest was illegal, the Supreme Court refused
to exclude the Lopez-Mendoza’s admission that he was not a legal resi-
dent. The Court concluded that “[t]here comes a point at which
courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot con-
tinue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervi-
sory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative
Branches.”108 Applying the exclusionary rule would simply be too in-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 573 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
107. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459
(1976)).
108. Id.
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convenient for immigration enforcement officials—even when the
Fourth Amendment is violated.
C. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
Although three million undocumented immigrants obtained law-
ful status under the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), the codification of employer sanc-
tions in IRCA was the driving force behind the legislation, not legali-
zation. Concerns over the number of undocumented workers
(predominantly Mexican) in the United States deepened in the 1970s
and early 1980s. While no one knew the exact number, some of the
more hysterical estimates ranged from eight to twelve million.109 Bor-
der Patrol and INS efforts were perceived as ineffectual. Penalizing
employers for hiring undocumented workers became a popular pro-
posal. IRCA represented the culmination of years of social, political,
and congressional debate about the perceived lack of control over our
southern border. Employer sanctions proposals went through several
iterations. In 1952, the notion of punishing employers for hiring un-
documented Mexicans was raised, but got nowhere. Beginning in
1973, legislative proposals featuring employer sanctions as a center-
piece reappeared and were touted as the tool needed to resolve the
undocumented alien “problem.”110 The Rodino Bill, pushed by pow-
erful House Democratic leader Peter Rodino in the late 1970s, was an
employer sanctions bill.111
By the end of the Carter Administration in 1980, the Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy portrayed legalization as
a necessary balance to sanctions. However, the story of congressional
support for IRCA is complicated. Although some broader-minded
members of Congress may have wanted legalization to be imple-
mented generously once enacted, Congress’ support for legalization
itself was decidedly underwhelming.
The 1986 federal employer sanctions were enacted as the major
feature of reform. By a bare swing vote of only four members of the
House of Representatives, legalization (amnesty) provisions were in-
109. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, GAO/IPE-82-9, PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS IN
ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF THE ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION (1982).
110. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, GGD-76-101, IMMI-
GRATION—NEED TO REASSESS U.S. POLICY 4 (1976).
111. See ANTOINETTE SEDILLO LOPEZ, LATINO EMPLOYMENT, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, AND
IMMIGRATION 201–13 (1995).
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cluded in the legislation. Under IRCA, for the first time, Congress
prohibited employers from hiring workers who were not authorized to
work in the United States, imposing civil and criminal penalties on
violators.
In response to intense lobbying by civil rights advocates and con-
cerned members of Congress, protections intended to safeguard
against discrimination were included in the law. IRCA mandated the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to conduct three annual
studies from 1987 to 1989 to determine whether employer sanctions
had resulted in “widespread discrimination.”112 A sunset provision fur-
ther stipulated that employer sanctions could be repealed if the GAO
concluded that compliance caused employers to discriminate.
The first two status reports on employer sanctions by the GAO
found that “one in every six employers in GAO’s survey who were
aware of the law may have begun or increased the practice of (1) ask-
ing only foreign-looking persons for work authorization documents or
(2) hiring only U.S. citizens.”113 Despite the GAO’s findings of wide-
spread IRCA-related employment discrimination and similar evidence
by independent researchers in its final two reports, Congress did not
repeal employer sanctions. Anti-immigrant groups, Senator Alan
Simpson (a co-sponsor of IRCA), and the American Federation of La-
bor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) routinely
dismissed the findings as insignificant or unreliable.114
III. The Chinese Exclusion Era and Beyond
The discovery of gold, a rice shortage, and the recruitment of
Asian labor led to noticeable Asian migration in the nineteenth cen-
tury, in turn triggering a backlash against those immigrants. Examin-
ing the impetus and development of exclusion laws directed first at
Chinese and eventually at all Asian immigrants reveals a sordid tale of
racism and xenophobia. The antipathy demonstrated toward Asians
112. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION REFORM STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING EM-
PLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR (1987) [hereinafter GAO, SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR];
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION REFORM STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS AFTER TWO YEARS (1988) [hereinafter GAO, SANCTIONS AFTER TWO YEARS];
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION REFORM STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS AFTER THREE YEARS (1989) [hereinafter GAO, SANCTIONS AFTER THREE YEARS].
113. See GAO, SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR, supra note 112; GAO, SANCTIONS AFTER TWO R
YEARS, supra note 112. R
114. By 2001, organized labor, including the AFL-CIO, realized that its future viability
rested solidly on the shoulders of immigrant workers; unions called for the repeal of em-
ployer sanctions and for the legalization of undocumented workers.
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paralleled the antipathy that America showed to individuals of African
descent. The attack on Asian immigrants represented the first com-
prehensive federal regulation of immigration that would later serve as
the model for exclusion of eastern and southern Europeans.
Early on, the Chinese were officially welcomed in the United
States. Chinese were actively recruited to fill labor needs in railroad
construction, laundries, and domestic service. In 1852, the governor
of California even recommended a system of land grants to induce the
immigration and settlement of Chinese. After the Civil War, Southern
plantation owners, who were worried that freed slaves would be “un-
manageable,” considered substituting Chinese coolie labor for Black
labor. Southern plantation owners visited California with this in mind.
And, during the 1870s, Chinese workers were imported to states like
Louisiana and Mississippi and pitted against Black workers. By 1882,
about 300,000 Chinese had entered and worked on the West Coast.115
By the late 1860s, the Chinese question became a major issue in
California and Oregon politics. Many white workers felt threatened by
the perceived competition from the Chinese, while many employers
continued to seek them as inexpensive laborers and subservient
domestics. Employment of Chinese by the Central Pacific Railroad was
at its peak. Anti-coolie clubs increased in number, and mob attacks
against Chinese became frequent. Much of this resentment was trans-
formed into or sustained by a need to preserve “racial purity” and
“Western civilization.”116
Sinophobic sentiment prevailed in Congress. First, Chinese immi-
grants were judged unworthy of citizenship. In 1870, Congress
amended the Nationality Act of 1790 extending the right of naturali-
zation to aliens of African descent, but Chinese were deliberately de-
nied that right because of their “undesirable qualities.”117 In 1875,
responding to law enforcement claims that Chinese women were be-
ing imported for prostitution, Congress passed legislation prohibiting
their importation for immoral purposes. Overzealous enforcement of
the statute, commonly referred to as the Page Law,118 effectively
barred Chinese women, exacerbating an already imbalanced sex ratio
among Chinese.
115. ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CAL-
IFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 19 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1962).
116. Id.
117. EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON & BALCH INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798–1965, at 57 (1981).
118. Page Law, ch. 143, 18 Stat. 147 (1875).
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The exclusion of prostitutes marked the beginning of direct fed-
eral regulation of immigration. During the 1881 session of Congress,
twenty-five anti-Chinese petitions were presented by a number of civic
groups, like the Methodist Church and the New York Union League
Corps, and from many states, including Alabama, Ohio, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Of course, California was at the center for demands of
exclusion.
Responding to this national clamor, Congress enacted the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882.119 The law excluded laborers for
ten years and effectively slammed the door on all Chinese immigra-
tion. Because Chinese women were defined as laborers, Chinese la-
borers who had already immigrated had no way to bring wives and
families left behind. The ban on laborers’ spouses effectively halted
the immigration of Chinese women, preventing family formation for
Chinese immigrants.
In 1904, Chinese exclusion was extended indefinitely, marking
the culmination of a thirty-five-year series of laws that limited and then
excluded Chinese immigrants. Not until the alliance with China dur-
ing World War II would Congress reconsider any aspect of those barri-
ers to membership. And not until 1965 would Congress substantially
alter nearly a century of laws aimed at keeping the Chinese
marginalized.
A. The Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan
Not coincidentally, the first appreciable number of Japanese im-
migrants entered at the height of the Chinese exclusion movement.
Agricultural labor demands, particularly in Hawaii and California, led
to increased efforts to attract Japanese workers after the exclusion of
the Chinese.
Like the initial wave of Chinese immigrants, Japanese laborers
were at first warmly received by employers. So many of them came
that the Japanese became the largest group of foreigners on the Ha-
waiian Islands. In San Francisco in 1869, the new immigrants were
described as “gentlemen of refinement and culture . . . [who] have
brought their wives, children, and . . . new industries among us.”120
By the turn of the century, unfavorable sentiment toward the Jap-
anese laborers grew as they began to migrate to the western United
States. After Hawaii was annexed in 1898, the Japanese were able to
119. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
120. PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983).
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use it as a stepping stone to the mainland, where the majority engaged
in agricultural work. Economic competition with white farm workers
soon erupted. Nativists—many motivated by racial dislike for Asians—
with the backing of organized labor in California formed the Japanese
and Korean Exclusion League (later renamed the Asiatic Exclusion
League). Exclusion once again became a major political issue—this
time the target was the Japanese.
In the wake of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, fierce anti-
Japanese rioting resulted in countless incidents of physical violence.
Japanese students in San Francisco were ordered to segregated
schools—an act that incensed Japan and later proved a major stum-
bling block in negotiations over restrictions on Japanese laborers. De-
mands for limits on Japanese immigration resonated.
Japanese laborers were eventually restricted but not in conven-
tional legislative fashion. Japan’s emergence as a major world power
(having defeated China in 1895 and Russia in 1905 wars) meant the
United States could not restrict Japanese immigration in the heavy-
handed, self-serving fashion with which it had curtailed Chinese immi-
gration. To do so would have offended an increasingly assertive Japan
when the United States was concerned about keeping an open door to
Japanese markets. To minimize potential disharmony between the two
nations while retaining the initiative to control immigration, President
Roosevelt negotiated an informal agreement with Japan.
Under the terms of the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement
reached in 1907 and 1908, the Japanese government refrained from
issuing travel documents to laborers destined for the United States. In
exchange for this severe but voluntary limitation, Japanese wives and
children could be reunited with their husbands and fathers in the
United States, and the San Francisco school board would be pressured
into rescinding its segregation order. In Takao Ozawa v. United
States,121 the Supreme Court endorsed the racism inherent in the nat-
uralization law concluding:
[T]o adopt the color test alone would result in a confused overlap-
ping of races and a gradual merging of one into the other, without
any practical line of separation. . . . [T]he federal and state courts,
in an almost unbroken line, have held that the words “white per-
son” were meant to indicate only a person of what is popularly
known as the Caucasian race. . . . With the conclusion reached in
these several decisions we see no reason to differ.122
121. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
122. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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B. Filipinos and Asian Indians
After the U.S. victory in the 1898 Spanish-American War, Presi-
dent McKinley concluded that the people of the Philippines were “un-
fit for self-government” and “there was nothing left for [the United
States] to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and
uplift and civilize and Christianize them.”123 The U.S. takeover was
met with violent resistance from many Filipinos.
Ironically, because the Philippines became a U.S. colony, Filipi-
nos automatically became noncitizen nationals of the United States
rather than aliens. They could travel in and out of the United States
without regard to immigration laws, and requirements for obtaining
full citizenship were relaxed. When appreciable numbers of Filipinos
came in after World War I (when Chinese and Japanese workers could
no longer be recruited) exclusionary efforts directed at them began.
The advent of the twentieth century witnessed the entry of other
Asians, such as Asian Indians, but in small numbers. A small number
of more educated Indians also entered. Even small numbers of Asian
Indians managed to agitate the Asiatic Exclusion League, which had
sprung up in response to Japanese and Korean immigration. The Cali-
fornia commissioner of state labor statistics concluded that the
“Hindu is the most undesirable immigrant in the state. His lack of
personal cleanliness, his low morals and his blind adherence to theo-
ries and teachings, so entirely repugnant to American principles,
make him unfit for association with American people.”124 Eventually,
Asian Indians were prevented from immigrating through the enact-
ment of the Asiatic Barred Zone in 1917.
Lower federal courts had granted lawful Asian Indian immigrants
the right to naturalize on the grounds they were Caucasians and thus
eligible “white persons” under the citizenship laws of 1790 and 1870.
But, in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,125 the Supreme Court re-
versed this racial stance, deciding that Indians, like Japanese, would
no longer be considered white persons, and were therefore ineligible
to become naturalized citizens.
The landmark national origin quota law enacted in 1924 restruc-
tured criteria for admission to respond to nativist demands and repre-
sented a general selection policy that remained in place until 1952.
123. JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A HISTORY 102 (1976).
124. CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, CALIFORNIA AND THE ORIENTAL: JAPANESE,
CHINESE AND HINDUS 111–21 (1920).
125. 261 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1923).
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The scheme limited immigrants of any particular country to two per-
cent of their nationality in 1890. The law eliminated the few remain-
ing categories for Asians. The 1924 Act provided for the permanent
exclusion of any “alien ineligible to citizenship.” The only Asians not
affected by the 1924 Act were Filipinos, who remained exempt as na-
tionals and who by then had settled into a familiar pattern of immigra-
tion. Limitations on Japanese immigrants led to an intense
recruitment of Filipino laborers because of their open travel status as
noncitizen nationals.
By the late 1920s, the call to exclude Filipino workers was seen by
Congress as an uncomplicated proposal that promised relief for the
Great Depression’s high unemployment. However, dealing with anti-
Filipino agitation was not as simple as responding to earlier anti-Chi-
nese, anti-Asian Indian, and even anti-Japanese campaigns. As U.S. na-
tionals, they could travel in and out of the country without constraint.
Until the Philippines were granted independence, Congress could not
exclude Filipinos.
The Tydings-McDuffie Act, passed in 1934, paved the way for ex-
clusion.126 When their nation became independent on July 4, 1946,
Filipinos lost their status as nationals of the United States. Those in
the United States were deported unless they had become immigrants.
Between 1934 and 1946, the Philippines were given an annual quota
of only fifty visas! Tydings-McDuffie signaled the formal end of an era.
The refusal to extend Asians the right to naturalize, the laws against
the Chinese, the Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan, the 1917 and
1924 Immigration Acts, and Tydings-McDuffie were the legacy of xen-
ophobia that explicitly codified racial exclusion.
C. The 1965 Framework for Selection
In 1952, Congress overhauled the immigration laws, but failed to
address concerns over the national origins quota system of the 1920s,
continuing the blatant form of racial and ethnic discrimination that
epitomized the system. Although the new law repealed the Asian ex-
clusion laws,127 in their place a new “Asia-Pacific Triangle” was estab-
lished with a trivial 2000 visa annual quota. Since the 1952 Act
126. Philippine Independence Act of 1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 459 (1934) (current version
at 22 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006)).
127. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952). The Chinese exclusion laws were repealed in 1943 in recognition of China’s alli-
ance with the United States in the war against Japan, but the annual quota was set at 105.
Chinese Exclusion Acts Repeal, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600–01 (1943).
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changed little in the immigration selection system, the question over
which immigrants to admit to the United States remained a bat-
tlefront. The law continued to exasperate many observers, including
President Truman, whose veto of the 1952 legislation (due in large
part to its failure to repudiate the quota system) was overridden by
Congress. President Truman did not relent, appointing a special Com-
mission on Immigration and Naturalization to study the system. A 319-
page report issued in 1953 strongly urged the abolition of the national
origins system and recommended quotas without regard to national
origin, race, creed, or color.128 President Eisenhower embraced the
findings, but his push for corrective legislation failed.
Entering office in January 1961, President Kennedy submitted a
comprehensive program that provided the impetus for ultimate re-
form. President Kennedy called for the repeal of the discriminatory
national origins quota system and the racial exclusion from the Asia-
Pacific triangle. President Kennedy’s hopes for abolishing the quota
system were only partially realized when the 1965 amendments were
enacted. The racial quotas were repealed as was the Asia-Pacific Trian-
gle geographic restrictions. But his egalitarian vision of visas on a first-
come, first-serve basis gave way to a narrower and more historically
parochial framework that provided few obvious advantages for pro-
spective Asian immigrants. The new law allowed 20,000 immigrant
visas annually for every country not in the Western Hemisphere. The
allotment was made regardless of size of a country, so that China had
the same quota as Tunisia. Of the 170,000 visas set aside for the East-
ern Hemisphere, seventy-five percent were for specified “preference”
relatives of citizens and lawful permanent residents, and an unlimited
number was available to immediate relatives (parents of adults, minor
unmarried children, and spouses) of U.S. citizens. The per country
limitation of 20,000 visas eventually led to severe backlogs in high visa
demand countries.129
D. Affirmative Action for Western Europeans: “Diversity” in the
1980s and 1990s
In spite of growing visa demands and backlogs for Mexico and
Asian countries since the 1970s, legislation to address those challenges
has never been forthcoming. In 1986, Congress responded to the ris-
ing domination of Asian and Latinos in immigration totals in a differ-
128. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE
SHALL WELCOME (1953).
129. See supra text accompanying note 96. R
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ent manner. Although the country’s population was still
overwhelmingly white and of European descent, Congress added a lit-
tle publicized provision in IRCA to help thirty-six countries that had
been “adversely affected” by the 1965 changes. To be considered “ad-
versely affected,” a country must have been issued fewer visas after
1965 than before. Thus, the list included such countries as Great Brit-
ain, Germany, and France, but no countries from Africa who sent few
immigrants prior to 1965. The “diversity” program was actually an af-
firmative action program for natives of countries whose ethnicity al-
ready made up the vast majority of the United States.
The 1986 law provided an extra 5000 such visas a year for 1987
and 1988, but the number increased to 15,000 per year for 1989 and
1990 through additional legislation. These visas were above and be-
yond the 20,000 visas that were already available for immigrants from
each of the “diversity” countries under the preference system. The
program required only that applicants meet the nationality, health,
and morals qualifications of immigration laws.
Part of the impetus for the “diversity” program was the fact that
many Irish nationals who came to the United States were unable to fit
into the regular immigration categories. In the 1980s, discouraged by
the Irish economy, many of Ireland’s young residents traveled to the
United States on temporary visas.130 Eventually they overstayed their
visas. By 1989, the Irish government estimated that perhaps 50,000
Irish nationals resided in the United States without documentation.
In 1988, Congress set aside 20,000 extra visas to increase immigra-
tion diversity over a period of another two years. This time, the “OP-1”
lottery for the visas was available to nationals of countries that were
“underrepresented,” namely a foreign state that used less than twenty-
five percent of its 20,000 preference visas in 1988. As a result, all but
thirteen countries in the world were eligible. Mexico, the Philippines,
China, Korea, and India were among the countries that were not eligi-
ble. Over 3.2 million applications were received for the 20,000 visas.
Legislation in 1990 extended the diversity visa concept even fur-
ther. Until October 1, 1994, a transition diversity program would pro-
vide 40,000 visas per year for countries “adversely affected” by the
1965 amendments, except that forty percent of the visas were effec-
tively designated for Irish nationals. After October 1, 1994, 55,000 di-
versity visas would be available annually in a lottery-type program to
130. See Ray Moseley, In Ireland, an Election, a Dilemma, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1987, at C12;
see also Poorest of the Rich, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1988, at 10.
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natives of countries from which immigration was lower than 50,000
over the preceding five years—certainly not Mexico, China, South Ko-
rea, the Philippines, or India. Under the 1990 diversity program, the
applicant had to have a high school education, or, within five years of
application, have at least two years of work experience in an occupa-
tion that required at least two years of training or experience. That
left out most Africans who wanted to immigrate.
IV. Contextualizing the Racialized Evolution of Immigration
Laws
The evolution of immigration policy, beginning with the forced
migration of African workers through the infamous Asian exclusion-
ary period and then to the southwest border regime, is critical in un-
derstanding today’s policies and enforcement approaches. This Part
explains how that evolution affects today’s outcomes. It also points to
other institutions that exacerbate the effects of the racialized immigra-
tion system.
A. Institutionalizing Racism
The construction of U.S. immigration laws and policies that be-
gan with the forced migration of Black labor, then vis-a`-vis the history
of Mexican and Asian immigration to the United States, has evolved
into a framework that is inherently racist. The current numerical limi-
tation system, while not explicitly racist, operates in a manner that
severely restricts immigration from Mexico and the high visa demand
countries of Asia.
The 1965 amendments represented a welcome change, but the
new law was no panacea. President Kennedy originally had proposed a
large pool of immigration visas to be doled out on a first-come, first-
serve basis without country quotas. Between 1965 and 1976, while the
rest of the world enjoyed an expansion of numerical limitations and a
definite preference system, Mexico and other countries of the West-
ern Hemisphere were suddenly faced with numerical limitations for
the first time. Today’s selection system is disruptive to families and
individuals; there is simply no room for many relatives of immigrants
because of numerical limitations and no room for those who are sim-
ply displaced workers. They do not qualify for special visas set aside for
professionals and management employees of multi-national corpora-
tions, or for those visas that require substantial funds for investment.
Similarly, the system has no slot for anyone whose livelihood is con-
trolled by trade agreements and globalization that cause job loss in
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low-income regions, as multi-national corporations, the beneficiaries
of free trade, relocate to other sites where their production costs are
cheaper.
The system results in severe backlogs in certain family immigra-
tion categories—particularly for spouses, unmarried sons and daugh-
ters of lawful permanent residents, and siblings of U.S. citizens. For
some countries, such as the Philippines and Mexico, the waiting peri-
ods for certain categories are ten to twenty years! Given the severe
backlogs and the continuing allure of the United States (not simply in
terms of economic opportunities, but because relatives are already
here due to recruitment efforts or political stability), many would-be
immigrants are left with little choice. Inevitably they explore other
ways of entering the United States without waiting. By doing so, they
fall into the jaws of the immigration exclusion laws that provide civil
and criminal penalties for circumventing the proper immigration
procedures.
The basic civil sanction of removal (deportation) applies to indi-
viduals who fall into the immigration trap while trying to reunify with
families or seeking economic opportunities. The categories of deport-
able aliens include the following: those who are in the United States
in violation of the immigration laws (e.g., entry without inspection,
false claim to citizenship); those non-immigrants who overstay their
visas or work without authorization; those who have helped others
enter (smuggled) without inspection; and those who are parties to
sham marriages. Additional civil penalties, including fines, can be im-
posed for forging or counterfeiting an immigration document, failing
to depart pursuant to a removal order, entering without inspection,
and entering into a sham marriage.
For many of these actions, Congress has also enacted criminal
provisions that go far beyond the civil sanctions. For example, the fol-
lowing acts are criminalized (subject to imprisonment and/or mone-
tary fines): falsifying registration information about the family;
bringing in (smuggling), transporting, or harboring (within the
United States) an undocumented alien (including family members);
entering without inspection or through misrepresentation; reentering
of an alien (without permission) after he or she has been removed or
denied admission; and making a false claim of U.S. citizenship. The
action of traveling to the United States by circumventing the current
structure can easily result in civil and, at times, criminal liability.
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B. From Dehumanization and Demonization to Criminalization
The institutionalized racism of U.S. immigration laws and en-
forcement policies reflects the evolution of immigration laws that
grappled with constant tension over who is and who is not acceptable
as a true American. Early in U.S. history, a western European perspec-
tive was constantly asserted in battles over immigration laws. That per-
spective was apparent in the forced migration of African workers and
in Asian exclusion laws, as well as in the anti-southern and eastern
European quota system of the 1920s, and is maintained to this very
day in the controversy over our southwest border. The Euro-centrism
of the nation’s identity has enabled the institutionalization of an im-
migration regime that commodifies those immigrants who are left
out—namely, newcomers of color—into a faceless group that can
more easily be demonized and even criminalized.
The process of criminalizing the immigrant and her dreams re-
quires multiple steps. First the immigrant is dehumanized, she is then
demonized and labeled a problem, then further dehumanized until at
last her actions or conditions are criminalized.131 This parallels what
Charles Lawrence terms “stigmatization . . . the process by which the
dominant group in society differentiates itself from others by setting
them apart, treating them as less than fully human, denying them ac-
ceptance by the organized community, and excluding them from par-
ticipating in that community as equals.”132
As Professor Magee has pointed out, the immigration system be-
gan the dehumanizing dynamics of racism with the forced migration
of Black laborers called slaves.133 Although early Chinese immigrants
were welcomed with mixed greetings, eventually the anti-Chinese
lobby that could not tolerate this “yellow peril” prevailed. Recruited
then rejected through efforts like Operation Wetback, Mexican mi-
grants also felt the sting of racial animus. All these groups were dehu-
manized through racism.
The next step, identifying immigrants as a problem through de-
monization involves familiar allegations: they take jobs; they cost a lot;
they commit crimes; they do not speak English; they damage the envi-
ronment; they do not share our values; and they simply are different.
This problematization-demonization process is implemented by the
131. I understand that the multiple steps toward criminalization I use overlap quite a
bit. Perhaps others might even suggest that immigrants of color are demonized before
being dehumanized depending on the action of the dominant group.
132. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 350.
133. See Magee, supra note 72. R
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likes of Patrick Buchanan, Lou Dobbs, Tom Tancredo, the Center for
Immigration Studies, and the Federation of American Immigration
Reform. And their tactics are successful in many quarters despite ques-
tionable empirical support for their positions. They attack with hyster-
ical statements. They do not mention race in their attacks and find a
ready audience in members of the public (some gullible, others who
themselves are malevolent) who look around, see immigrants with ac-
cents working, and facilely conclude that they must be taking jobs that
Americans would otherwise be holding. This brand of xenophobia is
recycled from the worst nativist periods of the nation’s history.
After hysteria is heightened, the demonization process continues
by asking the public if immigration is a problem. Modern day polls
and surveys claim to reveal that if asked specifically about immigra-
tion, eighty percent of respondents think that current immigration is
bad for the country. But when general polls ask respondents to name
serious societal problems, immigration is either ranked low or not
mentioned. Or when the public is asked whether legalization should
be granted to undocumented workers and families who pay a fine, the
resounding answer is yes. The surveys that suggest immigration is a
problem are reminiscent of what happened in California in 1879. A
specific measure was placed on the state ballot to determine public
sentiment towards Chinese immigration: 900 favored the Chinese,
while 150,000 were opposed. The demonization process continued as
the California legislature declared a legal holiday to facilitate anti-Chi-
nese public rallies that attracted thousands of demonstrators and was
completed when anti-Chinese groups presented anti-Chinese petitions
in Congress.
Even in the midst of a robust economy, the modern problema-
tization-demonization process was wildly successful. Restrictionist
strategies have worked, as their proponents define the issues largely in
their own terms of alleged economic and fiscal impact. Pro-immigrant
sentiment and immigrant rights groups essentially are silenced in the
media. The media offers seat-of-the-pants economic claims that blame
immigrants for job loss and wage depression in place of the more
complex reality. Nuanced findings are not good material for head-
lines. Similarly, politicians point fingers at the disenfranchised, voice-
less alien to grab the attention of voters. The media and these
politicians serve as convenient and effective conduits for demonizing
aliens. Their effectiveness is striking, as little attention is paid to the
pro-immigrant economic position.
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As the level of demonization through anti-immigrant rhetoric
reaches new heights, hot talk radio hosts, conservative columnists, and
politicians, Democrats and Republicans alike, chime in. The notion of
America as the land of immigrants is brushed aside. The neo-nativists
claim that things are different today; times have changed from even
just a few years ago. Much of the rhetoric strikes a chord with well-
meaning, but misguided, members of the public who have sensed a
lack of control over a variety of issues that affect their lives and who
are looking for simple answers. Scapegoating is in, and the blame can
be dispensed in non-racial terms, using phrases like “porous” borders,
“illegal” aliens, workers without “legal papers,” or “criminal” aliens be-
cause the structures of the visa and enforcement systems do the work
of exclusion and deportation that quietly impact immigrants of color.
Once demonized, immigrants can be further dehumanized. De-
humanization at this stage commodifies immigrants, stripping them of
race and ethnicity. The dominant group racializes the immigrant-as-
commodity notion to ignore race and view the immigrant as a worker
commodity. This facilitates the dehumanization that follows. Like the
Black-migrant commodities (enslaved African workers), the modern
immigrant commodity is not treated as human. Rather, immigrant
commodities are likened to “hazardous waste dumps.”134 Although
the Supreme Court has ruled that dangerous and hazardous materials
are “commerce” subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny, the immigrant-
toxic-waste-dump commodity has little constitutional protection in
this dehumanized state.135 Dehumanization thus silences the immi-
grants. Dehumanization allows the public to ignore their faces and
their names. Dehumanization further allows the powers that be to sep-
arate the immigrants into deportation categories, ignoring and never
asking why particular migrants come here in the first place.
134. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Supreme Court refused to ex-
tend the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment to deportation proceed-
ings. In the process, Justice O’Connor reasoned:
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to
prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste
dump if the evidence underlying the order had been improperly obtained, or to
compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs to their owner if the con-
traband had been unlawfully seized.
Id. at 1046.
135. See id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social
and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1997) (explaining
that even the use of the term “alien” may very well contribute to the demonization-dehu-
manization process).
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Employer sanctions—the statutory provision that justifies the ar-
rest of undocumented workers—is a final step in the dehumanization-
demonization-dehumanization-criminalization process. As noted
above, at the end of World War II, initial efforts to completely demon-
ize the immigrant worker by imposing employer sanctions on a labor
displacement theory failed. In the mid-1970s, the Rodino proposal was
constantly debated. Finally, the employer sanctions effort was accom-
plished as part of IRCA in 1986. Throughout the debate, Mexican
workers were largely the focal point, but they became dehumanized
and commodified simply as “unauthorized” workers once sanctions
were enacted.
C. Structural Relationships
Based on the manner in which immigration laws and enforce-
ment policies have evolved, racism has been institutionalized in those
laws and policies. However, writers such as john powell136 urge us to
do more and to examine how different institutions interrelate with
one another to produce an even more sinister dynamic.137 Thus, pow-
ell encourages us to look beyond the institutionalized racism within
U.S. immigration laws and enforcement policies that has become part
of the “structure” of those laws and policies, and to look at the interac-
tion between institutions for what he terms “structural racism.”138
Whatever the terminology, powell invites us to take the institution of
immigration laws and policies and see how that institution relates to
other institutions that can produce racial outcomes.
It does not take long to realize that while immigration laws and
enforcement policies have evolved in a manner that continues to prey
on Mexicans, Asians, and other Latin migrants, the relationship of
those laws and policies with other racialized institutions underscores
the structural challenges that immigrants of color face. Consider the
NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. NAFTA has placed Mex-
ico at such a competitive disadvantage with the United States in the
production of corn that Mexico now imports most of its corn from the
136. john powell does not capitalize his name as a political statement. About Us, john
a. powell, Executive Director, http://kirwaninstitute.org/about-us/john-a-powell.php (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009).
137. Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, Toward a Structural Racism Framework, 15
RACE & POVERTY 3, 4 (2006).
138. Id.; see also The Applied Research Center, About Us, http://www.arc.org/con-
tent/blogsection/4/200/ (urging a focus on “structural racism and systemic inequality
rather than simply personal prejudice”).
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United States, and Mexican corn farm workers have lost their jobs.139
The U.S.-embraced World Trade Organization, which advocates
global free trade, favors lowest-bid manufacturing nations like China
and India, so that manufacturers in a country like Mexico cannot
compete and must lay off workers.140 Is there little wonder that so
many Mexican workers look to the United States for jobs? Think also
of refugee resettlement programs as an institution. When Southeast
Asian refugees are resettled in public housing or poor neighbor-
hoods, their children find themselves in an environment that can lead
to bad behavior or crime.141 Consider U.S. involvement in wars and
civil conflict abroad. Think also of U.S. involvement in places like Vi-
etnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq—places that have produced involuntary
migrants of color to our shores. Other racialized institutions that in-
teract with immigration laws and enforcement also come to mind: the
criminal justice system, poor neighborhoods, and inner city schools.
Even coming back full circle to enslavement of people—today’s
human trafficking institutions—we begin to realize a sad interaction
with immigration laws that requires greater attention. All of these in-
stitutions can lead to situations that spell trouble within the immigra-
tion enforcement framework.
The immigration admission and enforcement regimes may ap-
pear neutral on their face, but (1) they have evolved in a racialized
manner and (2) when the immigration framework interacts with
other racialized institutions you realize that the structure generates
racial group disparities as well. NAFTA and globalization form a big
part of why many migrants of color cannot remain in their native
countries. The criminal justice system and poverty prey heavily on
poor communities of color, leading to deportable offenses if defend-
ants are not U.S. citizens.
D. Contemplating Remedies
Understanding that the nation’s laws and enforcement policies
resulted from institutionalized racism lends a wholly separate ratio-
139. Keith Sealing, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Farmers: NAFTA’s Threat to Mexican Teo-
sinte Farmers and What Can Be Done About It, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1383 (2003).
140. Id.; see generally Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migrants, 5 J. L.
ECON. & POL. 87 (2009).
141. Deborah Sontag, In a Homeland Far From Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at SM48;
see also Duc Ta, We All Make Mistakes One Day I’ll Be Free Thirty-Five Years to Life, 31 AMERASIA
J. 113 (2005); Bill Ong Hing, Detention to Deportation—Rethinking the Removal of Cambodian
Refugees, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 891 (2005).
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nale for immigration reform.142 Establishing a case of intentional dis-
crimination under the challenging standards required by the
Supreme Court in racial discrimination cases would be difficult.143 Yet
when serious negative racial effects of laws and policies are evident,
even if unintended or unconscious, then right thinking policy makers
and leaders can be motivated to do the right thing, legislatively and
administratively, for moral and practical reasons. Contemplating crea-
tive ways to remedy the damage is appropriate. In facing structural
racism, Anne Kubisch encourages us to be bold: “Though the struc-
tural approach may seem ‘too big,’ we ignore it at our peril and end
up placing unrealistic expectations on narrow, programmatic,
bandaid-like solutions. Instead, we must be ambitious and creative
about strategies . . . .”144
The premise that reform is needed to rectify the effects of institu-
tional racism challenges us to come up with innovative solutions. Be-
cause institutions are not race-neutral, dismantling structural racism
requires us to be race-conscious in our solutions, not colorblind. In
the visa context, we could take a page from the diversity program that
was extended to Irish and many other western European immigrants
in the 1980s and 1990s and create an affirmative action effort to fi-
nally give fair and equitable treatment to immigrants of color.
Given what we now know about the evolution of the immigration
selection system, initial attention should be paid to the number of
visas that are available to Latin and Asian countries. Options to be
considered would include:
142. Joe Hansen, the president of the UFCW, understands the racism that underlies
immigration enforcement:
[W]hether it’s deliberate or not, the actions of our government is [sic] fostering
racism and it’s fostering discrimination, and that hurts every one of us, and we
ought to be very, very careful about that, and that will continue if somebody
doesn’t stand up and stop it, and try to put an end to this abuse, and we do that
when we are silent.
IOWA HEARING, supra note 1, at 141. R
143. Charles Lawrence has argued forcefully against the requirement, which demands
that a litigant seeking redress for racial discrimination show that the defendant intended to
handicap the plaintiff on the basis of race, and bars recovery if the defendant inadvertently
acted in a way that harmed the plaintiff. This requirement makes little sense, Lawrence
asserts, because the source of much racism lies in the unconscious mind. Lawrence, supra
note 70. I believe that the requirement makes even less sense when racism is R
institutionalized.
144. Anne C. Kubisch, Why Structural Racism? Why a Structural Racism Caucus?, 15 POV-
ERTY & RACE 1, 3 (2006).
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• Clearing the serious backlogs faced by prospective immigrants
on the waitlist from Mexico, the Philippines, and other Asian
countries;
• Making available permanently extra visas to remedy the history
of exclusion and visa limitations that created the backlogs;
• Expanding family immigration categories so that unrestricted
family reunification could begin to take place for those immi-
grants that were numerically restricted;
• Creating flexible visas that allow individuals to spend substantial
time each year in their native country as well as the United
States—visas that reflect the transnational-globalized world in
which we now live;
• Replacing the per country numerical limitations system with a
first-come, first-served application system that would give coun-
tries with the highest demand the most visas;
• Providing special treatment for Mexico because of our long-
standing relationship and because NAFTA has cost Mexico a
large number of jobs; and
• Creating a generous legalization program for the undocu-
mented to rectify the history of exclusionary treatment.
In the deportation area, a discretionary waiver—much like the
one repealed in 1996 legislation—should be reinstated for longtime
lawful resident aliens and refugees who have committed a deportable
offense. The fact that so-called “criminal aliens” often entered as in-
fants and toddlers who grew up in low-income inner cities or other
challenging neighborhoods means that they are products of a part of
U.S. society that preys on people of color. Falling victim to those insti-
tutions is double-trouble for non-citizens, who then face criminal re-
moval grounds in federal immigration laws. Without an opportunity
to present their case of rehabilitation, remorse, or family hardship,
they are deported—casualties of structural racism.
Employer sanctions must be a primary target in the efforts to
remedy the effects of institutional racism. Understanding NAFTA,
globalization, and U.S. economic influence is enough for us to realize
that many immigrants are truly economic refugees. This understand-
ing and the human rights costs are sufficient bases for ending work-
place raids of the nature that occurred during the Bush
administration.
The rationale for employer sanctions always has been that the law
would dry up jobs for the undocumented and discourage them from
coming. Those of us who served on the UFCW commission that stud-
ied ICE raids across the country learned that, in reality, the law has
had disastrous effects on all workers. Instead of reinforcing or tweak-
ing employer sanctions, we would be much better off if we ended
them. Our experience shows that raids and workplace enforcement
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leave severe emotional scars on families. Workers were mocked. Chil-
dren were separated from their parents and abandoned at schools or
daycare. Increased enforcement has poisoned communities, spawning
scores of state and local anti-immigrant laws and ordinances that tar-
get workers and their families. Most importantly, employer sanctions
do not address the real question: why can’t migrant workers find work
back home instead of coming to the United States to feed their fami-
lies? While the racial effects of globalization are ignored, the racial
effects of employer sanctions are manifested in the arrests of “unau-
thorized” workers.
Trying to discourage workers from migrating by arresting them
for working without authorization is doomed to fail in the face of such
economic pressure. To reduce undocumented migration, we need to
change our trade and economic policies so that they do not produce
poverty in countries like Mexico. In early 2009, Ken Georgetti, presi-
dent of the Canadian Labour Congress, and John Sweeney, president
of the AFL-CIO, wrote to President Barack Obama and Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, reminding them that NAFTA and
other failed neo-liberal trade policies have left many Mexicans impov-
erished and caught in a desperate hunt for jobs and income wherever
those might be. Shortly thereafter, a new joint immigration position of
the AFL-CIO and Change to Win organizations recognized that “an
essential component of the long-term solution is a fair trade and
globalization model that uplifts all workers.”145 Continued support for
work authorization and employer sanctions contradicts this under-
standing. Even if a legalization program is enacted as part of compre-
hensive immigration reform, millions of people will remain without
papers as more come every year. For them, work without “authoriza-
tion” will still be a crime. And while employer sanctions have little
effect on migration, they will continue to make workers vulnerable to
employer pressure.
The alternative to employer sanctions is enforcing the right to
organize, minimum wage, overtime, and other worker protection laws.
Eliminating sanctions will not change the requirement that people im-
migrate to the United States legally. ICE will still have the power to
enforce immigration law. And if a fair legalization program were
passed at the same time sanctions were eliminated, many undocu-
mented workers currently in the United States would normalize their
status. A more generous policy for issuing residence and family-unifi-
145. AFL-CIO & CHANGE TO WIN, THE LABOR MOVEMENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR COMPRE-
HENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 1 (2009).
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cation visas would allow families to cross the border legally, without
the servitude-like restrictions of guest worker programs.
Conclusion
The construction of the U.S. immigration policy and enforce-
ment regime has resulted in a framework that victimizes Latin and
Asian immigrants. These immigrants of color end up being the sub-
ject of ICE raids. They are the ones who comprise the immigration
visa backlogs. They are the ones that attempt to traverse the hostile
southwest border. Their victimization has been institutionalized.
Any complaint about immigrants, fiscal or social, can be voiced in
non-racial, rule-of-law terms because the institution has masked the
racialization with laws and operations that are couched in non-racial
terms. Anti-immigrant pundits are shielded from charges of racism by
labeling their targets “law breakers” or “unassimilable.” Deportation,
detention, and exclusion at the border can be declared race-neutral
by the DHS because the system has already been molded by decades
of racialized refinement. Officials are simply “enforcing the laws.”
Like white privilege, institutionalized racism generally goes unrecog-
nized by those who are not negatively impacted.146
We should know better. The cards are stacked against immigrants
of color. The immigration law and enforcement traps are set through
a militarized border and an anachronistic visa system. It is no surprise
that Latin and Asian immigrants are the victims of those traps. They
have been set up by the vestiges of blatantly racist Asian exclusion
laws, a border history of labor recruitment like the Bracero Program,
Supreme Court deference to enforcement, and border militarization
that laid the groundwork for current laws and enforcement policies.
Many in the immigrant rights movement argue that the appalling
effects of ICE raids, deaths at the border that result from its militariza-
tion, horrible backlogs in family immigration categories, immigration
detention conditions, and the lack of second chance opportunities for
longtime, lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felonies
146. Sylvia Law puts it this way:
[W]hile white people benefit from white privilege, it is systemic and invisible, and
not a matter of individual wrong doing or guilt. I am not guilty of racism because
a cab picks me up. I do not discriminate when cops don’t stop me for no reason,
and then let me talk them out of a ticket. I am not a racist because my daddy got a
good VA mortgage that parleyed into good housing for the rest of our lives. That
is not the point. Like it or not, we white people do benefit from white privilege.
And most of the time we do not even notice it.
Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 616 (1999).
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are sufficient bases for overhauling immigration laws and enforce-
ment policies. If we are indeed a nation of immigrants, fairness, and
family values, then without a doubt, we need a fairer border policy
and more open immigration. Other critics of the Bush ICE raids focus
on employers or process as the solution. One standard demand that
has been made by Beltway experts is to focus more on employers
rather than on employees when it comes to enforcement. Another
tactic is that advanced by Senator John Kerry who asked that ICE raids
be conducted in a more humane manner.
I am not sure that these positions will get us much satisfaction.
Senator Kerry’s proposal would essentially result in kinder, gentler
raids, but raids nonetheless. And the focus-on-employer-enforcement
position still results in the removal of undocumented workers. For ex-
ample, while Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano has di-
rected federal agents to focus more on arresting and prosecuting
employers than undocumented workers, she also made it clear that
there will be no halt to arrests of undocumented workers the investi-
gations uncover.147 As long as we remain mired in the belief that we
need to prevent undocumented workers from working in the country
through an employer sanctions system, workers will continue to get
deported, families will be separated, and communities will suffer
damage.
The seemingly neutral logic that flows from an institutionally ra-
cist immigration system need not carry the day. We should not be left
to object to ICE raids, border enforcement, and even criminal alien
enforcement solely on non-racial terms. Understanding these opera-
tions from an institutionalized racial perspective provides another ba-
sis for arguing that our system of immigration laws and enforcement
policies must be overhauled in order to address the menacing vestiges
of racism within that system.
147. Rick Pedraza, Napolitano Says Raids to Target Employers, NEWSMAX.COM, Apr. 16,
2009, http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/napolitano_ice_raids/2009/04/16/203976.
html.
